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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 A grandmother alleges in this civil rights action that 
she was deprived of the custody of her granddaughter for five 
years in violation of rights secured by the Constitution.  The 
defendants are Chester County Children & Youth Services (“CYS”), 
individual CYS caseworkers, and an attorney retained by CYS to 
represent it in the judicial proceedings that transferred custody 
to the state.  We are called upon to decide whether and to what 
extent child welfare workers and attorneys who represent child 
welfare agencies are entitled to absolute immunity for actions 
taken in connection with dependency proceedings in state court.  
This is an issue of first impression in this circuit.  Like the 
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other courts of appeals that have addressed the issue, we hold 
that child welfare workers and attorneys who prosecute dependency 
proceedings on behalf of the state are entitled to absolute 
immunity from suit for all of their actions in preparing for and 
prosecuting such dependency proceedings. 
 
 I.  Facts1 
 Sylvia Ernst (“Ernst”) was the sole guardian of her 
minor granddaughter Susanne from infancy until the child was nine 
years old.2  At about that time, during the 1987-88 school year, 
a number of people in the Downingtown, Pennsylvania area where 
Ernst and Susanne lived became concerned about Susanne's well-
being.  A mover who had moved Ernst and Susanne into an apartment 
in Downingtown contacted police and expressed concern that there 
was something wrong in the relationship between Ernst and 
Susanne.  He reported that Susanne looked unwell and appeared too 
young to be Ernst's daughter.   
                     
1.  We accept the extensive findings of fact made by the district 
court after a trial on the merits. 
2.  Susanne's father is believed to be deceased, and her mother 
has had only occasional telephone contact with Susanne and Ernst 
since Susanne was two years old. 
 The Downingtown police conducted an investigation and 
learned that the Family Court of Nassau County, New York, had 
issued warrants for the arrest of Ernst and her daughter for 
child neglect and that a petition for custody of Susanne had been 
filed in 1981 but never served on Ernst.  Nassau County officials 
informed the Downingtown police that the warrants had been 
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vacated and the petition for custody of Susanne had been 
withdrawn.  The police informed a CYS employee of its 
investigation and of the status of the warrants, but the CYS 
personnel responsible for the decision to seek custody of Susanne 
were apparently unaware at the time of their decision that the 
Nassau County warrants had been withdrawn. 
 School officials at several schools Susanne attended 
became concerned about Susanne's frequent tardiness, poor 
attendance, and inability to separate from Ernst at the start of 
the school day.  The days would often begin with a scene outside 
Susanne's classroom during which Susanne would cry and scream and 
refuse to let go of her grandmother.  On May 3, 1988, after 
another morning tantrum, officials at the East Ward School in 
Downingtown contacted CYS and requested immediate intervention.  
CYS believed Susanne’s attachment to Ernst was sufficiently 
extreme to be unhealthy and filed a petition that same day 
seeking an adjudication of dependency3 and emergency custody of 
Susanne.  After an immediate detention hearing, Judge Stively of 
the Chester County Court of Common Pleas found that a prima facie 
                     
3.  A child is "dependent" under Pennsylvania law if he or she is 
"without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education 
as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his 
physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals."  42 Pa. C.S.A. 
§ 6302. 
 The dependency petition filed for Susanne contained a 
number of false allegations regarding her attendance records and 
the Nassau County warrants and custody petition.  However, the 
Court of Common Pleas later ruled that the errors were harmless 
because they did not form the basis of its subsequent 
adjudication of dependency. 
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case of dependency had been presented, and ordered Susanne placed 
in a psychiatric institution for a complete evaluation. 
 At a subsequent hearing on May 18, 1988, the parties 
stipulated to an adjudication of dependency, which resulted in  
temporary legal custody remaining with CYS.  The stipulation  
provided that CYS’s goal was the reunification of the family and 
that Ernst could receive counseling and treatment at the 
institution at which Susanne was being treated. 
 CYS retained custody of Susanne for the next five 
years.  During that time, Ernst and CYS waged an intense legal 
battle over Susanne’s dependency status and custody.  They also  
developed an extremely contentious relationship.  CYS caseworkers 
found Ernst to be uncooperative, antagonizing, and unwilling to 
acknowledge her parenting problems.  They also complained that 
she frequently made negative comments about CYS and Susanne’s 
foster families during visits with Susanne.  As CYS caseworkers 
became increasingly frustrated with Ernst, they sought and 
obtained restrictions on her visits with Susanne.  Ultimately, 
with the approval of the Chester County Court of Common Pleas and 
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, they changed CYS’s goal for 
Susanne from family reunification to long-term foster placement. 
 Meanwhile, Susanne occupied eight different placements at 
various foster homes and institutions.  Ultimately, her emotional 
and intellectual development deteriorated significantly. 
 Finally, in April 1993, a new judge assigned to review 
Susanne's placement recognized that "[t]he adversarial air of the 
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proceeding [concerning Susanne's dependency] ... at times ... 
captured the focus of many of those involved in this case instead 
of focusing on Susanne."  Juvenile No. 83 CS 88, Order of April 
26, 1993, Op. at 2.  Concluding that "[w]e have come to the point 
where state intervention in Susanne's life is now doing more harm 
than good," the court ordered that physical custody of Susanne be 
returned to Ernst, with legal custody remaining with CYS.  Ernst 
was granted legal custody on November 17, 1993. 
 During the pendency of the state court proceedings, 
Ernst filed this action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against CYS, various CYS caseworkers who were involved in 
Susanne’s case (the “CYS defendants”), three officials from the 
Downingtown Area School District, and Rita Borzillo, a private 
attorney who represented CYS throughout Susanne’s dependency 
proceedings.  Ernst’s complaint alleged (1) violation of 
procedural and substantive due process by all defendants for 
their improper "seizure" of Susanne; (2) violation of substantive 
due process by CYS, the CYS defendants, and Borzillo for the 
imposition of restrictions on visitation and for the 
recommendation of long-term placement instead of reunification; 
(3) violations of procedural due process in the course and 
conduct of state court proceedings; and (4) violation of the 
First Amendment by the Pennsylvania statute that presumptively 
closes juvenile dependency proceedings to the public.  The 
district court joined the Judiciary of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania to defend the First Amendment claim. 
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 The district court granted summary judgment to the 
Downingtown School officials on statute of limitations grounds, 
and to all defendants on all claims alleging procedural due 
process violations before May 24, 1991 on the ground that those 
claims had been fully and fairly litigated in state court.  The 
court granted partial summary judgment to the CYS defendants and 
Borzillo, ruling that they were entitled to absolute immunity 
"insofar as they acted in their prosecutorial capacity of filing 
petitions and making recommendations to the court."  The court 
held that the CYS defendants were not entitled to absolute 
immunity, however, for actions taken in their capacities as 
social workers formulating recommendations to be made to the 
court.  The court further held that Borzillo was not entitled to 
absolute immunity for actions taken in an "extra-prosecutorial" 
capacity. 
 A bench trial ensued on the claims that survived 
summary judgment.  After the trial, the court granted judgment to 
CYS, the CYS defendants, and the Judiciary of Pennsylvania.  
Although the court criticized the CYS defendants for flawed 
social work practice and inability "to submerge their personal 
views in dealing with a difficult woman" and focus on Susanne's 
welfare, Ernst v. Chester County Children & Youth Servs., No. 
CIV. A. 91-3735, 1993 WL 343375, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1993), 
it ultimately concluded that the CYS defendants' actions "were 
not so devoid of professional judgment or so clearly outrageous 
as to impose liability for constitutional violations.”  Id.  The 
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court held that CYS was not liable for any violations by the CYS 
defendants or Borzillo because Ernst had not shown that the 
actions were done by an official with policy-making authority or 
pursuant to a "policy" or "custom" of CYS.  Finally, the district 
court held that Ernst lacked standing to bring her First 
Amendment challenge to Pennsylvania's juvenile court closure 
provision because she could not raise the right of the “third-
party” public and press to access to the courts. 
 On the other hand, the court granted judgment in favor 
of Ernst against Borzillo.  The court held that Borzillo, who was 
a state actor for purposes of § 1983 while she represented CYS,  
violated Ernst's substantive due process rights when she sought 
appellate review of an order granting Ernst an unsupervised visit 
with Susanne.  The court found that Borzillo challenged the order 
primarily out of "animosity and anger at Ernst's small victory" 
in securing permission for an unsupervised visit.  Id. at *25.  
Nevertheless, the court found that the harm suffered by Ernst as 
a result of Borzillo’s actions was de minimis, consisting only of 
the difference between the value of the unsupervised visit 
ordered and the supervised visit Ernst actually had with Susanne, 
and awarded only nominal damages and attorneys’ fees.  
 Ernst timely appealed the district court's judgments 
against her on the substantive due process and First Amendment 
claims, and Borzillo cross-appealed.  We will affirm the 
judgments against Ernst in favor of the CYS defendants, albeit on 
the alternative ground that the CYS defendants are absolutely 
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immune for all of their actions in preparing for and prosecuting 
Susanne’s dependency proceedings.  We will also affirm the 
judgments in favor of CYS and the Judiciary of Pennsylvania.  
However, we will reverse the judgment against Borzillo on the 
ground that she is entitled to absolute immunity for the actions 
for which she was held liable by the district court. 
 
 II.  Jurisdiction 
 Because the federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction, we must first satisfy ourselves that we have 
jurisdiction over this appeal and cross-appeal. 
 
 A.  Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 
 The CYS defendants contend that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction to entertain Ernst’s suit under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal courts from exercising 
"subject matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a 
state's highest court or to evaluate constitutional claims that 
are 'inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision] 
in a judicial proceeding.'"  FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of 
Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (quoting Blake v. Papadakos, 953 
F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1992) (alteration in original); District of 
Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 
(1983)).  According to the CYS defendants, the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine precluded the district court from hearing Ernst’s § 1983 
claims because to decide those claims required the court to 
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determine whether the state courts correctly adjudicated Susanne 
a dependent.  We disagree, and find Rooker-Feldman inapplicable 
here. 
 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on the statutory 
provision that grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review 
the decisions of the highest state courts for compliance with the 
Constitution.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1257.  Because this jurisdiction 
is reserved exclusively to the Supreme Court, it is improper for 
federal district courts to exercise jurisdiction over a case that 
is the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court 
judgment.  See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 
(1923).  As this court recently explained: 
 
When a plaintiff seeks to litigate a claim in a federal 
court, the existence of a state court 
judgment in another case bars the federal 
proceeding under Rooker-Feldman only when 
entertaining the federal court claim would be 
the equivalent of an appellate review of that 
order.  For that reason, Rooker-Feldman 
applies only when in order to grant the 
federal plaintiff the relief sought, the 
federal court must determine that the state 
court judgment was erroneously entered or 
must take action that would render that 
judgment ineffectual. 
 
FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840 (citations omitted).  Those circumstances 
are not present here. 
 Although Ernst’s Third Amended Complaint sought her 
appointment as Susanne’s legal guardian, which was the relief 
that she had been unable to obtain in the state courts, that 
portion of the complaint was mooted when the state court returned 
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Susanne to Ernst’s custody.  Thus, the district court was left to 
decide only Ernst’s § 1983 claims for damages, which were 
grounded primarily in her allegations that the defendants 
violated her right to substantive due process when they 
formulated and made recommendations to the state court regarding 
Susanne’s dependency.  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not 
preclude the district court from deciding those claims because a 
ruling that the defendants violated Ernst’s right to substantive 
due process by making recommendations to the state court out of 
malice or personal bias would not have required the court to find 
that the state court judgments made on the basis of those 
recommendations were erroneous.  
 Moreover, it is clear that deciding the substantive due 
process claims did not involve federal court review of a state 
court decision because Ernst’s substantive due process claims 
were never decided by the state court.  Although Ernst mentioned 
her concerns about bias on the part of the CYS defendants during 
the dependency proceedings, she did not articulate those concerns 
in constitutional due process terms.  Neither did--or could--the 
state court base any decision regarding Susanne’s dependency on a 
determination that Ernst’s claims of bias or improper motive were 
invalid.  Cf. Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 
1992) (holding that a party cannot escape Rooker-Feldman by 
raising a new constitutional theory in federal court unless the 
party lacked a realistic opportunity to fully and fairly litigate 
the constitutional claim in the state court proceeding); 
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Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1433 (3d Cir. 1989).  A 
dependency adjudication involves a determination that a child is 
without proper parental care or control, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6302; In 
the Interest of J.M., 652 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 1995), and 
subsequent decisions regarding custody and placement are made on 
the basis of the best interests of the child.  42 Pa. C.S.A.  
§ 6351; In the Interest of Laura Sweeney, 574 A.2d 690, 691 (Pa. 
Super. 1990).  Neither an adjudication of dependency nor a 
determination of the appropriate disposition of a dependent child 
is based on the intentions or states of mind of the party seeking 
 the dependency adjudication.  Therefore, a finding that the CYS 
defendants violated Ernst’s right to substantive due process 
would not have involved the invalidation of any conclusion or 
judgment reached by the state court.4  Accordingly, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine did not preclude the court from exercising 
jurisdiction over Ernst’s substantive due process claims against 
the CYS defendants.  We have jurisdiction over the appeal 
therefrom pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
                     
4.  For this reason, the CYS defendants’ contention that Ernst’s 
§ 1983 claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
also fails.  Because the state court never made any decision 
regarding whether the defendants, in formulating recommendations 
to the state court regarding Susanne’s dependency status, 
violated Ernst’s substantive due process rights, the district 
court here was not precluded by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel from entertaining Ernst’s substantive due process 
claims.  See O’Leary v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1062, 
1065-66 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Under Pennsylvania law, ... a prior 
determination of a legal issue is conclusive in a subsequent 
action between the parties on the same or a different claim when 
(1) the issue was actually litigated; (2) the issue was 
determined by a valid and final judgment; and (3) the 
determination was essential to the judgment.”). 
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 B.  Cross-Appeal 
 Ernst argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to 
entertain Borzillo’s cross-appeal because Borzillo did not file a 
timely notice of appeal from the district court’s immediately 
appealable interlocutory denial of her motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds of absolute immunity.5  Instead, she 
waited and appealed from the final judgment against her. We 
reject Ernst’s argument because we hold that an interlocutory 
appeal from a denial of summary judgment on immunity grounds,   
although permitted, is not obligatory. 
 This court has not yet addressed the specific issue of 
whether a party that fails to file an appeal within 30 days after 
entry of an immediately appealable interlocutory order denying 
summary judgment on immunity grounds forfeits the right to 
challenge that denial on appeal from the final judgment.  
However, we have adopted the general rule that “[i]f matters are 
adjudged by an interlocutory decree that is subject to immediate 
appeal, and no appeal is taken, they are not foreclosed, but are 
subject to review on appeal from the final judgment,” 9 Moore’s 
Federal Practice § 110.18, at 194 (1996); id. at 195 n.2 (citing 
cases); see also 15A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & 
                     
5.  An order denying summary judgment on immunity grounds is 
immediately appealable because an immediate appeal is necessary 
to adequately protect the government official’s interest in 
avoiding the time and expense of litigation.  See Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511. 525 (1985); Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 
1241, 1245 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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Procedure § 3911, at 359 & n.78 (citing cases), in another 
context.  Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. George, 105 F.2d 697, 699 
(3d Cir. 1939) (holding that interlocutory appeal from 
interlocutory injunction is permissive rather than mandatory, and 
injunction thus may be challenged on appeal from either the 
interlocutory order or the final judgment).  The Seventh Circuit 
has described the rationale for the general rule: 
Although a party has a right to take an immediate 
appeal, there is no obligation to do so....  
A rule that required people to appeal from 
potentially “final” decisions not embodied in 
separate documents [within the meaning of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58] would lead to a blizzard 
of protective appeals as litigants tried to 
ensure their rights to review; many times the 
rule would lead to pointless forfeitures as 
litigants overlooked the possibility that a 
particular order might be characterized as a 
“final decision.” 
 
Exchange Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 290 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original).  Moreover, “[m]aking 
interlocutory appeals ... mandatory would turn the policy against 
piecemeal appeals on its head.”  Hunter v. Department of Air 
Force Agency, 846 F.2d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting In re 
Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 669 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
 We can see no meaningful distinction between 
interlocutory orders denying summary judgment on immunity grounds 
and other appealable interlocutory orders.  Accordingly, we think 
it appropriate to extend the general rule to interlocutory orders 
denying summary judgment on immunity ground.  See McIntosh v. 
Wienberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1431 n.7 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying 
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general rule to orders denying summary judgment on immunity 
grounds because the interest in protecting public officials from 
monetary liability for official acts survives even after a trial 
has been held).  Therefore, Borzillo did not forfeit her right to 
appeal the district court’s denial of her motion for summary 
judgment on immunity grounds by waiting to file a notice of 
appeal until after entry of a final judgment against her.  We 
thus have jurisdiction to consider the immunity issue raised in 
her cross-appeal. 
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 III.  Ernst’s Appeal 
 A.  CYS Defendants’ Absolute Immunity 
 Ernst challenges the district court’s grant of partial 
summary judgment to the CYS defendants based on absolute immunity 
“insofar as they acted in their prosecutorial capacity of filing 
petitions and making recommendations to the court.”  Order of 
Jan. 27, 1993.  She contends that the CYS defendants cannot claim 
entitlement to immunity from suit under § 1983 because child 
welfare workers employed by the state did not exist, and thus 
enjoyed no immunity from suit at common law, in 1871 when § 1983 
was enacted.  Although we recognize that state-employed social 
workers enjoyed no common law immunity from suit in 1871, we 
nonetheless hold that the CYS defendants are entitled to absolute 
immunity for their actions in petitioning and in formulating and 
making recommendations to the state court because those actions 
are analogous to functions performed by state prosecutors, who 
were immune from suit at common law. 
 Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State ... subjects ... any citizen of the United States ... 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party 
injured.”  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).  Despite its broad 
language, the Supreme Court has consistently held that this 
provision did not abolish long-standing common law immunities 
from civil suits.  See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484 (1991) 
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(citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)); Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976).  Instead, courts must 
determine whether a particular governmental official is entitled 
to immunity according to the following analysis:  
[The] initial inquiry is whether [the] official 
claiming immunity under § 1983 can point to a 
common-law counterpart to the privilege he 
asserts.  If “an official was accorded 
immunity from tort actions at common law when 
the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1871, the 
Court next considers whether  
§ 1983's history or purposes nonetheless counsel 
against recognizing the same immunity in § 
1983 actions.” 
 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986) (quoting Tower v. 
Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984)).  Courts “look to the common 
law and other history for guidance because [their] role is ‘not 
to make a freewheeling policy choice,’ but rather to discern 
Congress’ likely intent in enacting § 1983.”  Burns, 500 U.S. at 
493 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 342). 
 The fact that a particular public official did not 
enjoy absolute immunity at common law is not, however,  
determinative of the absolute immunity issue.  Where the official 
claiming immunity occupies a governmental position that did not 
exist at common law, he may still be entitled to immunity if he 
performs official functions that are analogous to functions 
performed by those who were immune at common law.  See Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (holding that officials who perform 
quasi-judicial and quasi-prosecutorial functions in 
administrative agency adjudications are entitled to the same 
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immunities afforded to judges and prosecutors at common law); see 
also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) (“Running 
through our cases, with fair consistency, is a ‘functional’ 
approach to immunity questions other than those that have been 
decided by express constitutional or statutory enactment.  Under 
that approach, we examine the nature of the functions with which 
a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully 
entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that exposure to 
particular forms of liability would likely have on the 
appropriate exercise of those functions.”).  It is therefore 
necessary for us to review the functions performed by officials 
to whom absolute immunity has been accorded in order to determine 
if child welfare workers perform analogous functions. 
 Under its historical and functional approach, the 
Supreme Court has held that certain officials “functioning as 
integral parts of the judicial process” are absolutely immune 
from civil suits under § 1983.  McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 
1083, 1084 (3d Cir. 1992).  For example, the Court has declared 
that judges, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), prosecutors, 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), and witnesses, Briscoe 
v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), are entitled to absolute immunity 
when they perform judicial or quasi-judicial acts that are 
integral parts of the judicial process. 
 In Imbler v. Pachtman, the Court held that prosecutors 
were absolutely immune at common law from civil liability for 
malicious prosecution and that public policy considerations 
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countenanced a similar absolute immunity from suits under § 1983. 
 424 U.S. at 424.  The relevant public policy considerations were 
numerous.  First, a prosecutor’s exercise of his independent 
judgment would likely be compromised if he were threatened with 
suits for damages for his actions in initiating and prosecuting 
criminal cases in court.  Id. at 424-25.  Such suits “could be 
expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will 
transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription 
of improper and malicious actions to the State’s advocate.”  Id. 
at 425.  Second, the prosecutor’s energy would be diverted from 
his official duties if he were forced to defend himself against  
§ 1983 actions.  Id.  Third, defending against § 1983 actions 
likely would be particularly difficult for a prosecutor: 
[T]he honest prosecutor would face greater difficulty 
in meeting the standards of qualified 
immunity than other executive or 
administrative officials.  Frequently acting 
under serious constraints of time and even 
information, a prosecutor inevitably makes 
many decisions that could engender colorable 
claims of constitutional deprivation.  
Defending these decisions, often years after 
they were made, could impose unique and 
intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor 
responsible annually for hundreds of 
indictments and trials. 
 
Id. at 425-26.  Fourth, failure to afford absolute immunity to 
prosecutors might undermine the functioning of the criminal 
justice system because it might lead prosecutors concerned about 
personal liability not to tender evidence that, while relevant, 
might conceivably turn out to be fabricated by the witness.  Id. 
at 426.  Fifth, failure to afford absolute immunity might weaken 
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the fairness of the criminal justice system by clouding 
postconviction review with “the subconscious knowledge that a 
post-trial decision in favor of the accused might result in the 
prosecutor’s being called upon to respond in damages for his 
error or mistaken judgment.”  Id. at 427.  Finally, the court 
noted that absolute immunity for prosecutors would not leave the 
public without any means to punish or deter unconstitutional 
conduct because the availability of both judicial review and 
professional disciplinary procedures would protect the public and 
punish the errant prosecutor.  Id. at 429.  Thus, the Court 
concluded that “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the 
State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for 
damages under § 1983.”  Id. at 431. 
 In Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991), and Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), the Court clarified the scope 
of a prosecutor’s absolute immunity from suit under § 1983.  In 
Burns, the Court held that a prosecutor was absolutely immune 
from liability for his presentation of evidence in a probable 
cause hearing but was not absolutely immune for the provision of 
legal advice to police officers investigating a case.  
Emphasizing its “functional approach” to immunity under § 1983, 
the Court reiterated that absolute immunity extends only to 
prosecutorial activities that are “intimately associated with the 
judicial phase of the criminal process.”  Burns, 500 U.S. at 493 
(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430).  Such activities include both 
the initiation and prosecution of the State’s case and certain 
  
 
 22 
“actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution” but 
nonetheless integral to the judicial prosecution of the case.  
Id. at 491 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33). 
 In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, the Court again declared 
that “the Imbler approach focuses on the conduct for which 
immunity is claimed,” 509 U.S. at 271-72 (emphasis added), and 
the “functional tie” between that conduct and the judicial 
process in a criminal case.  Id. at 277-78.  It distinguished 
between a prosecutor’s functioning as an “advocate” in judicial 
proceedings on behalf of the State, which is entitled to 
immunity, and as an investigator searching for clues that might 
lead to an arrest, which is not entitled to absolute immunity. 
 Applying the principles set forth in Butz, Imbler, and 
their progeny to the instant case, we hold that the CYS 
defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions  
on behalf of the state in preparing for, initiating, and 
prosecuting dependency proceedings.  Their immunity is broad 
enough to include the formulation and presentation of 
recommendations to the court in the course of such proceedings.  
We reach this conclusion because (1) the functions performed by 
the CYS defendants in dependency proceedings are closely 
analogous to the functions performed by prosecutors in criminal 
proceedings; (2) the public policy considerations that 
countenance immunity for prosecutors are applicable to child 
welfare workers performing these functions; and (3) dependency 
proceedings incorporate important safeguards that protect 
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citizens from unconstitutional actions by child welfare workers. 
 With this holding, we join the courts of appeals of the Fourth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.  See, e.g., 
Millspaugh v. County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Wabash County, 937 
F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1991); Vosburg v. Department of Soc. 
Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1989); Salyer v. Patrick, 874 
F.2d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 1989); Meyers v. Contra Costa County 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1987).6 
 The functions performed by child welfare workers like 
the CYS defendants in dependency proceedings are closely 
                     
6.  Justices Thomas and Scalia recently criticized the appellate 
court cases that have held that social workers are entitled to 
absolute immunity for quasi-prosecutorial acts on the ground that 
 
[a]n official seeking ... immunity ... must at the 
outset show that a “counterpart to the 
privilege he asserts” was recognized at 
common law in 1871....  The courts that have 
accorded absolute immunity to social workers 
appear to have overlooked the necessary 
historical inquiry; none has seriously 
considered whether social workers enjoyed 
absolute immunity for their official duties 
in 1871.  If they did not, absolute immunity 
is unavailable to social workers under  
§ 1983.  This all assumes, of course, that “social 
workers” (at least as we now understand the 
term) even existed in 1871.  If that 
assumption is false, the argument for 
granting absolute immunity becomes (at least) 
more difficult to maintain. 
 
Hoffman v. Harris, 114 S. Ct. 1631 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (citations omitted).  However, there 
has been no indication that the other justices on the Court 
perceive the appropriate historical inquiry in the same way as do 
Justices Thomas and Scalia.  Indeed, it seems to us inconsistent 
with the Court’s holding in Butz to do so. 
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analogous to those performed by prosecutors.  As the Ninth 
Circuit has explained, 
[a]lthough child services workers do not initiate 
criminal proceedings, their responsibility 
for bringing dependency proceedings, and 
their responsibility to exercise independent 
judgment in determining when to bring such 
proceedings, is not very different from the 
responsibility of a criminal prosecutor.  The 
social worker must make a quick decision 
based on perhaps incomplete information as to 
whether to commence investigations and 
initiate proceedings against parents who may 
have abused their children. 
 
Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1157.   
 In addition, child welfare workers involved in the 
prosecution of dependency proceedings clearly serve “as advocate 
for the State,” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 n.33, in a capacity 
that is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of  the 
[child protection] process.”  Id. at 430.  A CYS court liaison 
officer and a case work supervisor  testified that CYS 
caseworkers, after consultation with their supervisors and other 
professionals such as psychologists and school officials, 
determine what recommendations are made to the court in 
dependency proceedings.  Even when they work with an attorney who 
represents CYS in the dependency proceeding, the attorney plays 
no role in formulating the recommendations made to the court; she 
merely "expresses [CYS’s] recommendations on [its] behalf."  App. 
at 518a.  Because CYS caseworkers are directly responsible for 
the recommendations made to the court in dependency proceedings, 
their actions in determining those recommendations and 
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communicating them to the court are "intimately associated" with 
the judicial process in much the same way as are a prosecutor’s 
actions in representing the state in criminal prosecutions. 
 Moreover, we conclude that the public policy 
considerations supporting absolute immunity for prosecutors are 
equally applicable to child welfare workers acting in a quasi-
prosecutorial capacity in dependency proceedings.  Like a 
prosecutor, a child welfare worker must exercise independent 
judgment in deciding whether or not to bring a child dependency 
proceeding, and such judgment would likely be compromised if the 
worker faced the threat of personal liability for every mistake 
in judgment.  Certainly, we want our child welfare workers to 
exercise care in deciding to interfere in parent-child 
relationships.  But we do not want them to be so overly cautious, 
out of fear of personal liability, that they fail to intervene in 
situations in which children are in danger.  See Millspaugh, 937 
F.2d at 1176-77; cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191-93 (1989).   
 In the absence of absolute immunity, we would expect 
suits in retaliation for the initiation of dependency proceedings 
to occur with even greater frequency than suits against 
prosecutors.  Parents involved in seemingly unjustified 
dependency proceedings are likely to be even more resentful of 
state interference in the usually sacrosanct parent-child 
relationship than are defendants of criminal prosecution.  See 
Vosburg, 884 F.2d at 137.  In turn, the likely frequency of such 
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suits would result in a significant diversion of the energies of 
child welfare workers away from their official duties to the 
defense of § 1983 litigation.  Further, defending against § 1983 
actions would likely be as difficult for child welfare workers as 
it would be for prosecutors because child welfare workers, like 
prosecutors, must make quick decisions on the basis of limited 
information.  “Defending these decisions, often years after they 
are made, could impose unique and intolerable burdens on [child 
welfare workers] responsible annually for hundreds of [dependency 
and child abuse cases].”  Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425-26. 
 Finally, as with prosecutors, there are alternative 
mechanisms other than the threat of § 1983 liability that protect 
the public against unconstitutional conduct by child welfare 
workers.  First, the judicial process itself provides significant 
protection.  See Millspaugh, 937 F.2d at 1177.  Child welfare 
workers must seek an adjudication of dependency from a neutral 
judge whose decisions are guided by the “best interests of the 
child” and subject to appellate review.  Second, although child 
welfare workers are not subject to the comprehensive system of 
professional responsibility applicable to prosecutors, they are 
under the supervision of the agency that employs them.  The 
agency has an incentive to ensure that its employees do not 
violate constitutional rights because it is not immune from suit 
for abuses committed by employees with policy-making authority or 
acting pursuant to agency policy or custom. 
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 Reviewing Ernst’s Third Amended Complaint, it is clear 
that all of the claims against the CYS defendants concern actions 
taken by the defendants in connection with the formulation and 
presentation of recommendations to the state court regarding 
Susanne’s dependency status and disposition.  Because all of 
these actions are analogous to a prosecutor’s preparation for and 
initiation and presentation of a criminal prosecution, we hold 
that the CYS defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for the 
conduct that Ernst challenges here.7 
 We cannot agree with the district court’s conclusion 
that the CYS defendants’ actions in preparing and formulating 
recommendations to the state court were not within the scope of 
their absolute immunity.  The Supreme Court has explicitly 
rejected the idea that absolute prosecutorial immunity “extends 
only to the act of initiation itself and to conduct occurring in 
                     
7.  We emphasize that our holding concerns only actions taken by 
child welfare workers in the context of dependency proceedings.  
Like our sister courts in the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth 
Circuits, we would be unwilling to accord absolute immunity to 
“investigative or administrative” actions taken by child welfare 
workers outside the context of a judicial proceeding.  See Snell 
v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that pre-
adjudicatory investigative activities by child welfare workers 
are entitled only to qualified immunity); Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 
886 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that opening and 
investigating child abuse case and placing parent’s name on 
central registry of abusers are investigative and administrative 
activities entitled only to qualified immunity); Austin v. Borel, 
830 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that filing of complaint 
that allowed child services to obtain custody but did not 
initiate adjudicative proceeding was analogous to police 
officer’s complaint filed to obtain arrest warrant and was 
therefore entitled only to qualified immunity) (citing Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986)); Millspaugh v. County Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare of Wabash County, 937 F.2d 1172 (7th Cir. 1991) (same). 
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the courtroom.”  Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272.  Moreover, the Court 
has expressly embraced the idea that immunity must be afforded to 
the evaluation of available data to determine whether and in what 
manner to seek judicial action:  
We expressly stated [in Imbler] that "the duties of the 
prosecutor in his role as advocate for the 
State involve actions preliminary to the 
initiation of a prosecution and actions apart 
from the courtroom," and are nonetheless 
entitled to absolute immunity....  We have 
not retreated ... from the principle that 
acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing 
for the initiation of judicial proceedings or 
for trial, and which occur in the course of 
his role as an advocate for the State, are 
entitled to the protections of absolute 
immunity.  Those acts must include the 
professional evaluation of the evidence 
assembled by the police and appropriate 
preparation for its presentation at trial or 
before a grand jury after a decision to seek 
an indictment has been made. 
 
Id. at 272-73.   
 Ernst here challenges the CYS defendants’ formulation 
of professional judgments that served as the basis for a series 
of recommendations they made to the Pennsylvania Court of Common 
Pleas.  To grant them absolute immunity for the recommendations 
they made to the court but deny them such immunity for the 
observations and judgments that were the necessary predicate for 
those recommendations would eviscerate the immunity they did 
receive and undermine the purposes sought to be advanced by the 
grant of absolute immunity.  We therefore conclude that, like a 
prosecutor’s evaluation of evidence in preparation for indictment 
or trial, the CYS defendants’ gathering and evaluation of 
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information and professional opinions regarding the relationship 
between Ernst and Susanne in preparation for the dependency 
proceedings must be protected.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
grant of judgment for the CYS defendants’ for their actions in 
formulating recommendations concerning Susanne’s dependency 
proceedings on the ground of absolute immunity rather than the 
substantive due process analysis relied on by the district court. 
 
 B.  Liability of CYS 
 The district court granted judgment in favor of CYS 
because it found that Ernst had failed to prove at trial that CYS 
had a policy or custom of allowing its employees to violate 
substantive due process or of inadequate training, supervision, 
or discipline of its employees in that regard.  See Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (holding that 
municipality cannot be held liable for constitutional violations 
committed by employees unless such violations occurred pursuant 
to a policy or custom promulgated by the municipality).  Ernst 
does not argue on appeal that this finding was clearly erroneous. 
 Instead, she contends that the district court erred when it 
failed to consider evidence that CYS was liable under § 1983 on 
the theory that substantive due process violations were committed 
by an official with policy-making authority.  We find that the 
district court did not err in refusing to consider the proffered 
“evidence.” 
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 During the bench trial, Ernst attempted to prove that 
CYS had a policy or custom of violating the substantive due 
process rights of the families with which it was involved by 
calling several witnesses to testify about their dissatisfaction 
with CYS’s handling of their cases.  After the record had been 
closed and the parties had offered closing argument, Ernst’s 
counsel, perhaps realizing that the testimony then in evidence 
would not suffice to prove a “policy or custom” of 
unconstitutional conduct by CYS, urged the court to also consider 
the possibility that CYS was liable under § 1983 for substantive 
due process violations committed by a CYS official with policy-
making authority.  See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 
469, 480-81 (1986) (holding that municipality may be liable under 
§ 1983 for constitutional deprivation that occurs because of a 
single action taken by an official with final decision-making 
authority to take such action).  As proof of such 
unconstitutional conduct by a CYS policy-maker, Ernst’s counsel 
directed the court to an affidavit by Wayne Stevenson, the 
director of CYS, that had been submitted with CYS’s motion for 
summary judgment.  According to the affidavit, Stevenson was 
familiar with and had approved of the handling of the Ernst case. 
 However, Stevenson had not been called to testify during the 
trial nor had the affidavit been offered into evidence.  
Accordingly, the district court ruled that it would not consider 
the contents of the affidavit in determining whether CYS was 
liable under § 1983. 
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 Ernst argues on appeal that the district court erred in 
failing to take judicial notice of the affidavit as a judicial 
record in the case.  See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (court shall, at any 
stage of a proceeding, take judicial notice, upon request by a 
party, of a fact not subject to reasonable dispute because it is 
generally known or is “capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned”); Randy’s Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. 
Nissan Motor Corp., 533 F.2d 510, 521 (10th Cir. 1976) (“the 
court may take judicial notice of its own records, especially in 
the same case”); McCormick on Evidence § 330, at 396 (4th ed. 
1992).  Ernst acknowledges that the doctrine of judicial notice 
only permits the court to take notice of the fact of the 
submission of the affidavit. Nonetheless, she argues that the 
contents of the affidavit are themselves admissible for their 
truth under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2), which provides that a 
statement made by and offered against a party is not hearsay. 
 We find no reversible error.  The fact that the 
statements contained in the Stevenson affidavit may not be  
hearsay says nothing about whether the court erred in refusing to 
consider the substance of the statements when the contents of the 
affidavit were never offered into evidence during the trial.  
While the district court undoubtedly had the authority to reopen 
the record, it is apparent that it did not abuse its discretion 
in declining to do so.  We hold, therefore, that the district 
court did not err in refusing to consider the Stevenson affidavit 
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as evidence of CYS’s liability under § 1983, and we will affirm 
the grant of judgment for CYS. 
 
 C.  The First Amendment Challenge to  
    Juvenile Court Closure Provision 
 Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act provides in relevant part: 
Except in hearings to declare a person in contempt of 
court and in [delinquency] hearings as 
specified in subsection (e), the general 
public shall be excluded from hearings under 
this chapter.  Only the parties, their 
counsel, witnesses, the victim and counsel 
for the victim, other persons accompanying a 
party or a victim for his or her assistance, 
and any other person as the court finds have 
[sic] a proper interest in the proceedings or 
in the work of the court shall be admitted by 
the court.... 
 
42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6336(d).  The Official Comment to the section 
states that “[t]he section as drawn permits the court in its 
discretion to admit news reporters.  This is frequently done with 
the understanding that the identity of the cases observed will 
not be published, a procedure generally satisfactory to the news 
media.” 
 Ernst argued before the district court that this 
closure provision violated the First Amendment right of access to 
judicial proceedings enjoyed by the public and press.  The 
district court declined to address Ernst’s First Amendment claim 
because it found that Ernst lacked standing to raise the 
constitutional rights of the public and press.  On appeal, Ernst 
argues that the district court erred in refusing to permit her to 
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raise the right of access of the public because she is a member 
of the public entitled to raise the right on her own behalf. 
 Although we agree that Ernst shares the public’s right 
of access to the courts, we nonetheless hold that the district 
court was correct in concluding that Ernst lacked standing to 
bring her First Amendment claim.  We reach this conclusion 
because even though Ernst, along with the rest of the public, 
possesses a general right of access to the courts, she has not 
alleged or shown that she suffered the injury-in-fact necessary 
to create a justiciable “case or controversy” under Article III 
of the Constitution. 
 The doctrine of standing is "an essential and 
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 
III" of the Constitution.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  To satisfy the standing requirement, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an "injury in fact" which is both 
"concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent"; (2) a 
causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct; 
and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision.  Id. at 560-61.  The “injury in fact” 
component requires that the plaintiff “allege a distinct and 
palpable injury to himself.”  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 
(1975).  The injury must “affect the plaintiff in a personal and 
individual way.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. 
 A generalized injury shared by the plaintiff with the 
public at large is insufficient to create a concrete “case or 
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controversy” over which a federal court may exercise its 
jurisdiction.  Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the 
War, 418 U.S. 208, 219-20 (1974).  As the Court explained in 
Schlesinger, 
[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated upon an 
interest of the kind ... which is held in 
common by all members of the public, because 
of the necessarily abstract nature of the 
injury all citizens share.  Concrete injury, 
whether actual or threatened, is that 
indispensable element of a dispute which 
serves in part to cast it in a form 
traditionally capable of judicial resolution. 
 It adds the essential dimension of 
specificity to the dispute by requiring that 
the complaining party have suffered a 
particular injury caused by the action 
challenged as unlawful.  This personal stake 
is what the Court has consistently held 
enables a complainant authoritatively to 
present to a court a complete perspective 
upon the adverse consequences flowing from 
the specific set of facts undergirding the 
grievance....  Only concrete injury presents 
the factual context within which a court, 
aided by parties who argue within the 
context, is capable of making decisions....  
[T]he requirement of concrete injury further 
serves the function of insuring that 
[constitutional] adjudication does not take 
place unnecessarily. 
 
Id. at 220-21. 
 Here, Ernst failed to allege the kind of concrete and 
particularized injury necessary to establish standing to assert a 
First Amendment challenge to Pennsylvania’s juvenile court 
closure provision.  She has not alleged that she has ever been 
excluded under the closure provision from a proceeding to which 
she sought access.  The only First Amendment allegation in her 
Third Amended Complaint asserts that “Sylvia Ernst’s first 
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amendment rights are being violated by not opening up the record 
of this case; courts are closed to press.”  Compl. ¶ 64.  During 
argument before the district court on the First Amendment issue, 
Ernst’s counsel agreed with the court that Ernst was “not 
complaining about her exclusion from a particular hearing but ... 
about the unconstitutionality of the statute because all the 
proceedings are closed to the press and public.”  App. at 872a 
(emphasis added). 
 Because Ernst has alleged only a generalized harm to 
the public at large from the closure provision, we hold that she 
lacks standing to assert a First Amendment challenge to the 
provision.  
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 IV.  Borzillo’s Cross-Appeal 
 Ernst’s only success at trial was against CYS attorney 
Borzillo, against whom she was awarded nominal damages and 
attorneys’ fees.  The district court found that Borzillo violated 
Ernst’s right to substantive due process when she filed a 
petition for rehearing en banc with the President Judge of the 
Chester County Court of Common Pleas and obtained a stay of a 
court order granting Ernst an unsupervised visit with Susanne.  
Borzillo cross-appeals the district court’s grant of judgment 
against her, arguing, inter alia, that she is entitled to 
absolute immunity for her activity in connection with the 
petition.  
 In its pre-trial grant of partial summary judgment for 
the defendants, the district court held that Borzillo was 
entitled to absolute quasi-prosecutorial immunity for her actions 
in representing CYS in connection with Susanne’s dependency 
proceedings.8  However, the court held that Borzillo was not 
                     
8.  Although Borzillo does not exercise independent judgment in 
determining what specific recommendations are made to the court 
regarding the appropriate disposition of a dependent child, see 
supra, p. 22, she exercises independent judgment in offering 
legal advice to CYS on such issues as, for example, whether there 
is sufficient evidence to pursue a dependency adjudication.  
Moreover, in representing CYS before the court, Borzillo clearly 
acts as an advocate on behalf of the state in a role that is 
"intimately associated" with the judicial process.  Thus, her 
duties, like those of the CYS defendants, are closely analogous 
to those of a prosecutor advocating on behalf of the state in a 
criminal prosecution.  Accordingly, for reasons similar to those 
set forth in Part III-A, we agree with the district court that 
Borzillo is entitled to absolute immunity for her representation 
of CYS. 
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immune for actions she took on CYS’s behalf after Judge Melody of 
the Chester County Court of Common Pleas removed her from 
Susanne’s case. 
 Borzillo’s removal from Susanne’s case arose from an 
exchange she had with the court during a November 20, 1991 
hearing before Judge Melody, who was then newly assigned to the 
case.  During the hearing, but outside the presence of CYS or its 
attorney, Judge Melody spoke with Susanne about her desire to 
have an unmonitored weekend home visit with her grandmother.  
Upon learning that the court was considering granting a home 
visit, Borzillo returned to the courtroom to "object 
strenuously."  In the apparent belief that Judge Melody was on 
the verge of granting the home visit, Borzillo commented, "Your 
Honor, I find it interesting that you are making a decision 
without reading the file of this case."  App. at 2075a-76a.  The 
following exchange ensued: 
 THE COURT:  I didn’t make any decision.  I'm 
disturbed with you, Ms. Borzillo.  You are 
saying that I'm making decisions and I 
haven't made any decision.  I am talking to 
people and I resent the fact that you are 
saying that I am making decisions.  I haven't 
made any decision yet, -- 
 
 MS. BORZILLO:  I am sorry, Your Honor. 
  
 * * * 
 THE COURT:  Ms. Borzillo, I observed the way 
you acted.  You did not act as a professional 
attorney.  You came in with an obvious bent 
and chip on your shoulder with your face . . 
. red as a beet, red as a tomato, mad, 
distraught, upset.  You did not act as a 
responsible attorney, in my humble opinion.  
I do not think that you can possibly be 
objective with regard to this case and the 
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attorney involved for CYS has to be objective 
and because you cannot be objective and 
because of what you demonstrated to me, you 
cannot help us with regard to this case, and 
by that I mean, you cannot help the Court and 
I don't believe that you can help in the best 
interest of this child.  So in the best 
interest of this child, you are going to be 
removed from this case and someone else is 
going to have to become involved in the case. 
 In the meantime, all matters are continued 
until that is done.  
 * * * 
 MR. WILSON [Susanne’s court-appointed 
attorney]: Your Honor, may I ask that she 
remain in the case.  
 
 THE COURT: We will not have a meeting at this 
time until CYS is represented.  So, we will 
have CYS represented by someone and then I 
would be happy to have a meeting with you and 
other counsel. 
 
 MR. WILSON: I would ask that you reconsider 
Ms. Borzillo’s removal from the case. 
 
 THE COURT: I am not going to reconsider it.  
It was so obvious in the way that she stormed 
into this room, that she cannot be objective. 
 I have been a lawyer since 1960, I have been 
a Judge since May of 1981, I know people, I 
know lawyers, and it’s obvious to me that the 
way that she stormed in here with her face as 
red as a beet or red as a tomato, that she 
cannot be objective with regard to this case 
and she cannot, in my humble opinion, to aid 
me as a Judge and in my humble opinion, she 
cannot be objective, which would be in the 
best interest of the child and that’s why in 
my opinion she should no longer remain in the 
case.  Because of the way that she acted, 
it’s too obvious to me that new blood, by way 
of a new attorney for CYS, has to be infused 
in this case. 
 
 MR WILSON: Your Honor will not reconsider? 
 
 THE COURT: I will not reconsider.  It’s too 
obvious to me that she is too personally 
involved in this case to the extent -- well, 
you saw the way she acted and I don’t have to 
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say anymore, so that will take care of things 
for today. 
 
Transcript of November 21, 1991 Hearing, at 34-37, App. at 2076a-
78a & Supp. App. at 1. 
 Judge Melody did not immediately issue an order 
implementing his declared intention to remove Borzillo and to 
require CYS to retain new counsel.  Moreover, contrary to his 
statement that all matters would be continued until a new 
attorney was appointed by CYS, Judge Melody issued an order on 
December 13, 1991 granting Ernst a one hour unsupervised visit 
with Susanne.  Upon receiving a copy of the order from Ernst's 
attorney on December 18, 1991, CYS asked Borzillo to look into 
the matter and try to prevent the unsupervised visit from taking 
place.   
 Borzillo contacted Judge Melody's chambers at 11:05 
A.M. to challenge the issuance of the order and was informed that 
the judge would not be available to entertain a motion for 
reconsideration until December 23rd.  Judge Melody did, however, 
send Borzillo a letter, dated December 18, 1991, threatening 
contempt proceedings if CYS did not comply with the visitation 
order, and further stating, “As of this moment, you are not 
counsel for Children & Youth Services in this case.  However, you 
may be reinstated in the future for Children & Youth Services in 
this case.”  In his letter, Judge Melody acknowledged that he had 
"handed down the order sua sponte without input from Children & 
Youth Services or anyone else because [he] believed it was in the 
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best interest of the child to do so."  The letter indicated that 
a copy had been dispatched to President Judge Lawrence Wood of 
the Chester County Court of Common Pleas. 
 Continuing her efforts to prevent the unmonitored visit 
from taking place, Borzillo, on December 18, 1991, filed with 
President Judge Wood a motion for argument en banc and a motion 
to stay Judge Melody's visitation order.  Judge Wood granted a 
stay at 9:21 A.M. the next day, and Ernst’s visit with Susanne 
that afternoon was supervised.  Shortly thereafter, Judge Melody 
withdrew from the case, it was reassigned, and the new judge 
allowed Borzillo to continue representing CYS. 
 The district court held that Borzillo was not entitled 
to immunity for actions taken during the time that she was 
“removed” from the case because those actions were “in breach of 
a court order” and as such were “not within the prosecutorial 
function.”  Ernst v. Children & Youth Servs. of Chester County, 
No. CIV. A. 91-3735, 1993 WL 343375, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 
1993) (citing Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare, 925 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1991)).  On the merits, the court 
found that Borzillo’s efforts to prevent Ernst from enjoying a 
single unsupervised visit with Susanne were “motivated by 
animosity and anger at Ernst’s small victory” and “exceeded the 
bounds of zealous advocacy.”  Id. at *25.  Because we conclude 
that Borzillo was not acting completely outside her authority as 
CYS’s attorney, we reject the district court’s conclusion and 
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hold that Borzillo is entitled to absolute immunity for her 
actions taken on CYS’s behalf on December 18-19, 1991.  
 As we explained in Part III-A, a prosecutor or other 
official performing a quasi-prosecutorial function for the state 
is entitled to absolute immunity for official actions taken on 
behalf of the State that are integrally related to the judicial 
process. If absolute immunity is to serve its purpose, the line 
between official conduct, as to which there is immunity, and 
extra-official conduct, as to which there is not, must be drawn 
without reference to the official’s subjective state of mind.  It 
must also be drawn in a manner that leaves officials room for 
good faith mistakes about the extent of their authority.  Thus, 
if the circumstances in a particular case were such that a 
reasonable prosecutor in the defendant’s position could have had 
a good faith belief that he was authorized by his office to act 
as he did, immunity will be recognized.  In such a case, an 
allegation that the official acted in bad faith, knowing his 
conduct to be unauthorized, will not strip the official of 
absolute immunity.  Similarly, absolute immunity will be 
available, in such a case, even if the authority in fact was 
lacking under the law.  Stated conversely, immunity will be 
denied only for those acts which a reasonable prosecutor would 
recognize as being "clearly outside his jurisdiction" to 
represent the state before the court.  Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 
581, 591 (3d Cir. 1966). 
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 Bauers illustrates the governing principles.  It was a 
civil rights action in which the defendant prosecutor had 
instituted and prosecuted a criminal proceeding against the 
plaintiff in a New Jersey court of general jurisdiction.  A 
higher New Jersey court subsequently held that because the 
defendant had been under 18 years of age at the time of the 
alleged offense, jurisdiction was lodged exclusively in the 
Juvenile Court.  Accordingly, the indictment, sentence and 
ensuing incarceration were found to be illegal.  The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant knew that plaintiff had not reached 
the age of 18 at the time of the alleged crimes and, accordingly, 
that the prosecution would deny plaintiff due process of law.  We 
accepted both this allegation and the legal proposition that the 
prosecution had been beyond the defendant’s authority.  We 
nevertheless held that the defendant was entitled to absolute 
immunity based on the following rationale: 
 We have already indicated that the primary 
responsibility of a prosecutor is to 
vindicate the wrongs which have been 
committed against society.  This is precisely 
what appellee was doing when the denial of 
appellant’s liberty occurred.  The mere fact 
that the New Jersey Legislature had excised 
from his responsibility the prosecution of 
individuals who were under the age of 
eighteen when they committed acts which would 
otherwise be punishable offenses does not 
indicate that he was acting clearly outside 
his jurisdiction. 
 
Bauers, 361 F.2d at 591; see also Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 
694 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[w]hile a prosecutor might lose absolute 
  
 
 43 
immunity when he acts with a complete and clear absence of 
authority, such a condition does not occur when a prosecutor has 
an arguable basis of authority"). 
 With this background, we turn to the facts of this 
case.  Borzillo was an attorney in private practice who was 
engaged by CYS from time to time to represent it in dependency 
proceedings.  By December 18, 1991, her representation of CYS in 
Susanne’s dependency matters was entering its 43rd month.  During 
that representation, there had been countless appearances before 
the court and, by December 18, 1991, the relevant factual 
background of the matter could fairly be characterized as  
extensive. 
 As we have noted, the act which the district court 
found to be beyond the scope of Borzillo’s absolute immunity was 
the filing in court on December 18th of a petition seeking review 
of an order entered without notice to her client.  The petition 
was filed at her client’s request and did nothing more than 
present to the court the views and position of her client with 
respect to that order.  Thus, like the challenged conduct of the 
prosecutor in Bauer, the conduct Ernst challenged here was 
precisely the kind of activity in which one occupying Borzillo’s 
office would be expected to engage. 
 It is true that Ernst alleged, and the court found, 
that Borzillo and her client filed this petition because of 
hostility to Ernst rather than for the purpose of serving the 
best interest of Susanne.  As we have explained, however, the 
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subjective motivation behind the challenged action cannot deprive 
Borzillo of immunity if a reasonable person in her position could 
have believed she was acting within the scope of her authority. 
 The district court also concluded that the filing of 
the petition was "in breach of a court order."  Ernst, 1993 WL 
343375, at *24.  While we agree that the existence of a court 
order directing that the challenged act not be done is highly 
relevant to, and will ordinarily be determinative of, whether a 
prosecuting attorney has acted in a "clear absence of authority," 
there were extenuating circumstances here. 
 At the November 20, 1991, hearing before the court, 
Judge Melody, after an emotionally charged exchange, concluded 
that Borzillo could not be "objective" about the case.  The judge 
then announced that Borzillo would be removed and that someone 
else would have to become involved in the case.  He assured the 
parties that "in the meantime, all matters [would be] continued 
until that was done."  No order followed directing CYS to secure 
new counsel.  Given the nature, length and frequency of the 
proceedings in this matter, a change of counsel was not something 
that CYS could easily accomplish.  In light of this fact and the 
emotional character of the November 20th hearing, we believe CYS 
cannot be faulted for waiting to see if an order requiring a 
change of counsel would actually ensue. 
 From CYS’s perspective, matters remained in a holding 
pattern until the morning of December 18th when it received from 
Ernst’s counsel a copy of an order directing that an unsupervised 
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visit take place the next day.  This order came as a complete 
surprise since CYS had received no notice that an application for 
this relief had been filed.  It believed that such a visit was 
not in Susanne’s interest and asked Borzillo to see what could be 
done.  Borzillo first tried to convey her client’s view to Judge 
Melody.  When advised that Judge Melody was unavailable, Borzillo 
filed the challenged petition for rehearing en banc and a stay.   
 The "order" removing Borzillo to which the district 
court referred in its ruling may have been in the letter 
apparently written by Judge Melody during the afternoon of 
December 18th in which he informed Borzillo that she was removed 
from the case "as of this moment."  The district court made no 
express finding, however, that this letter was received by 
Borzillo prior to the filing of the challenged petition, and we 
have found no record evidence that would support such a finding. 
 Nonetheless, even if we were to assume that Judge Melody’s 
letter was hand-delivered to Borzillo prior to the filing of the 
petition, we could not say that the petition she filed was 
clearly in excess of her authority. 
 Borzillo’s client had had no previous opportunity to 
express its views on Ernst’s application.  Nor had it previously 
had the opportunity to challenge Judge Melody’s December 18th 
letter order removing its counsel from the case, presumably for 
lack of objectivity.  There was clearly no time to secure 
substitute counsel; the order that CYS wished to challenge would 
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become moot before new counsel could review the matter and file a 
petition. 
 Judge Melody’s December 18th letter order "removing" 
Borzillo was not entered for the benefit or protection of an 
opposing party.  Nor was it entered as a sanction for conduct the 
judge had found to be disruptive of the judicial process.  
Rather, it was entered presumably because the judge believed 
Borzillo would not, at least for the moment, be able to assist 
him in determining what was in Susanne’s best interest. 
 In this context, we believe a reasonable attorney in 
Borzillo’s position could have concluded that she owed a duty to 
her client to seek judicial review at its behest and that 
petitioning for that review before the court en banc was not what 
Judge Melody intended to preclude by writing his December 18th 
letter.  It necessarily follows that Borzillo did not act in a 
clear absence of authority.9 
                     
9.  In the course of reaching its contrary conclusion, the 
district court suggested that Borzillo improperly failed to 
disclose to Judge Wood the fact that Judge Melody had removed her 
from the case.  The basis for this suggestion is not clear to us, 
but, in any event, it does not alter our conclusion that Borzillo 
did not act in clear absence of authority.  If Borzillo did not 
receive Judge Melody’s December 18th letter before she filed her 
petition on that day, we believe the "removal" situation was 
sufficiently ambiguous that a disclosure on the subject was not  
required.  Even if Borzillo received Judge Melody’s letter before 
her filing with Judge Wood, we believe, as we have explained, 
that a reasonable attorney in Borzillo’s position reasonably 
could have believed that seeking review before another judge was 
not something Judge Melody intended to preclude.  Moreover, if 
Borzillo received Judge Melody’s letter before filing, she would 
have known from the face of the letter that a copy had been 
dispatched to Judge Wood. 
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 Because we hold that Borzillo is entitled to absolute 
immunity for all of her quasi-prosecutorial activities while 
representing CYS in connection with Susanne’s dependency 
proceedings, we will reverse the district court’s grant of 
judgment against her and remand for entry of judgment in her 
favor. 
 
 V. 
 The district court found it "disappointing that [the 
CYS] professionals were unable to submerge their personal views 
in dealing with a difficult woman or to give her sufficient 
credit for fighting placements out of genuine concern for 
[Susanne’s] welfare."  Ernst, 1993 WL 343375, at *23.  There is 
ample evidence in the record to support this view, as well as the 
view that their inability to do so had unfortunate consequences 
for Susanne and her grandmother.  Nevertheless, we must 
acknowledge, as did the district court, the interest of the state 
in ensuring the independent and effective operation of the agency 
charged with protecting the state’s children.  That overriding 
interest precludes this court from affording Ernst compensation 
for whatever injuries she may have suffered at the hands of CYS. 
 We will affirm the district court’s grant of judgment in favor 
of CYS and the CYS defendants.  We will reverse the grant of 
judgment in favor of Ernst against Borzillo and remand for entry 
of judgment in favor of Borzillo. 
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